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By Hiromichi Umebayashi (Japan)
Second Generation NWFZs
A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) is a manifestation ofinternational or regional efforts to limit nuclear weapons — themost destructive weaponry humankind has ever created.
However, a NWFZ is meant to achieve more than this. The objectives
of a NWFZ include not only limiting nuclear weapons, but also making
a significant contribution to maintenance of international peace and
security in areas with varied historical backgrounds, some with long-
standing disputes. In order to attain such objectives to ensure regional
security in a broader sense, NWFZs have been pursued, achieved and
maintained. As is well known, currently there are five NWFZs, each
established and governed by an international treaty and named after the
place associated with their negotiation. They are Latin America and the
Caribbean NWFZ stipulated by Tlatelolco Treaty, South Pacific NFZ
stipulated by Rarotonga Treaty, Southeast Asia NWFZ stipulated by
Bangkok Treaty, African NWFZ stipulated by Pelindaba Treaty and
Central Asia NWFZ stipulated by Semipalatinsk Treaty.
Besides these established zones, there have been ideas and proposals
for new NWFZs that are still relevant today, such as Middle East Zone
Free of Nuclear Weapons as well as Other Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD), South Asia NWFZ, Central Europe NWFZ and Northeast
Asia NWFZ.
The Middle East NWFZ was first proposed by Iran supported by
Egypt in 1974. Since that time the UN General Assembly has adopted
the resolution to support the idea every year. In 1990, President Mubarak
of Egypt proposed an extended idea of the Middle East Zone Free of
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WMD. The Middle East Resolution adopted at the 1995 NPT Review
and Extension Conference calls upon all states parties to NPT to make
efforts to ensure the establishment of such zone. Among the well known
difficult issues in relation to the Middle East NWFZ are Israeli nuclear
capabilities and unsafeguarded nuclear activities outside the NPT and
Iranian uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing programs, both
under the sustained military tension between Israel and Arabic nations.
Since the Indian nuclear test in 1974, a South Asia NWFZ has been
a subject of UN General Assembly. A proposal of such zone is to
encompass seven states that are members of the South Asian Association
for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), i.e. Bangladesh, Bhutan, India,
the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. However, after the
successive nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in 1998, the idea was
forced to come to a deadlock. However, the civil society in the region
continues to pursue the realization of the NWFZ as a goal for
denuclearization of India and Pakistan. Both countries have not acceded
to the NPT and have unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. India considers
nuclear weapons essential for national security in the world where some
nations are allowed to possess such weapons for the indefinite period of
time. Pakistan considers nuclear weapons necessary to deter the India’s
intent of aggression.
The Central Europe NWFZ was first proposed by Soviet Union in
1956 and so called Rapacki-plan was presented by Poland in 1957 to
make Poland, Czechoslovakia, East and West Germany nuclear-free.
After the end of the Cold War, a new idea was introduced by Belarus in
1995 and later backed by Ukraine to make Central and Eastern Europe
NWFZ (CEE-NWFZ) from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea. This initiative
might draw more attention in light of the recent tension between Russia
and eastward expanded NATO.
Regarding the Northeast Asia nuclear weapons, ideas and the history
have already been discussed in this conference.
When comparing the case of these potential NWFZs with that of
the existing five zones, we see obvious “obstacles” to achieve such new
zones. Namely, in this case, nuclear weapons have already built in to
the security policy in some of the key countries involved. In some cases,
so-called de facto nuclear-weapon holders (India, Pakistan and Israel)
or claimant nuclear-weapon holders (DPRK) are involved. In some cases,
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some non-nuclear countries adopt their security policy dependent on
the extended nuclear deterrence of the nuclear powers, especially of the
United States, including hosting permanent military bases on their own
soil. Also in some cases, some non-nuclear countries are vulnerable to
strong political influence of the nuclear super powers. It is true that the
political pressure from the super powers is nothing new in developing a
NWFZ, as we see a recent example in the case of Central Asia NWFZ,
but in some cases in question it will be outstanding. Because of such
common features, we may call these prospective NWFZs “Second
Generation NWFZs.”
Nuclear-Weapon Dependent Non-Nuclear Countries
In the following, I would like to focus on the issue of the non-
nuclear countries that adopt declared security policy to depend upon
the extended deterrence of the nuclear weapon states, namely “nuclear-
weapon dependent non-nuclear countries,” as it is related to the potential
constituents of a NEA-NWFZ, including my own country Japan. There
are 26 such countries, namely 23 non-nuclear NATO countries, including
Germany, Italy and new members after NATO eastward expansion,
and three U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific; Australia, the ROK and Japan.
The most recent NATO’s strategic document “The Alliance’s
Strategic Concept,” adopted at the 1999 NATO summit, describes the
role of nuclear weapons in the Alliance as follows: “The supreme
guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear
forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the
independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which
have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence
and security of the Allies” (Para. 62). Also it describes the requirement
of the participation of the member countries in such nuclear roles as
follows: “A credible Alliance nuclear posture and the demonstration of
Alliance solidarity and common commitment to war prevention continue
to require widespread participation by European Allies involved in
collective defense planning in nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear
forces on their territory and in command, control and consultation
arrangements” (Para. 63). This basic document remains valid today.
In case of Australia, the most recent Defence White Paper “Defence
2000 – Our Future Defence Force” states, after emphasizing that
Australia’s relationship with the United States “should not be a
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relationship of dependency” and that “self-reliance will remain an
inherent part of its alliance policy,” “There is one important exception
to this principle of self-reliance. Australia relies on the extended
deterrence provided by US nuclear forces to deter the remote possibility
of any nuclear attack on Australia.” The White Paper “Defence 2000”
has been updated twice since then, in 2003 and in 2005. There is no
reference to the extended deterrence in either updates. However, it will
not mean there was a policy change, because the updates in these cases
were not the replacement of the previous document but only the addition
to adapt to the change of the security environment. I will discuss more
on the Australian case in relation to its participation in the South Pacific
NWFZ.
The ROK’s reliance on the US extended nuclear deterrence has
repeatedly been confirmed in the US-ROK bilateral Security
Consultative Meeting (SCM) between the defense ministers of the two
countries. The most recent SCM Joint Communique on 20th October
2006, ten days after the DPRK nuclear test, reads “Secretary Rumsfeld
offered assurances of firm U.S. commitment and immediate support to
the ROK, including continuation of the extended deterrence offered by
the U.S. nuclear umbrella, consistent with the Mutual Defense Treaty.”
The most recent version of the Japan’s “National Defense Program
Outline, FY 2005-” issued in December 2004, describes its nuclear policy
as follows, after ensuring its adherence to the three non-nuclear
principles, “To protect its territory and people against the threat of
nuclear weapons, Japan will continue to rely on the U.S. nuclear
deterrent. At the same time, Japan will play an active role in creating a
world free of nuclear weapons by taking realistic step-by-step measures
for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.” This U.S. nuclear
umbrella was reconfirmed in the most recent Joint Statement of the
Security Consultative Committee (SCC) attended by foreign and defense
ministers of both countries in May 2007. It reads “U.S. extended
deterrence underpins the defense of Japan and regional security. The
U.S. reaffirmed that the full range of U.S. military capabilities – both
nuclear and non-nuclear strike forces and defensive capabilities – form
the core of extended deterrence and support U.S. commitments to the
defense of Japan.”
All these governmental official documentation demonstrates that
the nuclear dependent non-nuclear countries believe in the nuclear
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deterrence no less than the nuclear armed countries. In this circumstance,
they would logically go nuclear if the nuclear umbrella is removed as is
often mentioned with reference to Japan. If the nuclear threats are morally
unacceptable, then the protection by nuclear umbrella is morally
unacceptable as well. Moreover, in order to maintain the umbrella, they
will not be able to press nuclear powers to disarm. Therefore, to establish
a NWFZ involving nuclear dependent non-nuclear weapon states will
provide such states with the solid and moral ground to play an essential
role in nuclear disarmament.
Compliance with the NPT Obligations for
Non-Nuclear State Parties
This brings us to an important argument on how to encourage
nuclear dependent non-nuclear countries to establish a NWFZ.
The norms that govern the NPT regime at present should come
from the “unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapon states to
accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons,” as is agreed in the
final document adopted by consensus at the 2000 NPT Review
Conference. Both the concluding recommendation in June 2006 by the
WMD Commission chaired by Hans Blix and the concluding remark by
Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan at Princeton University in
November 2006 are manifestations of such norms. The WMD
Commission recommends that “all states possessing nuclear weapons
should commence planning for security without nuclear weapons. They
should start preparing for the outlawing of nuclear weapons through
joint practical and incremental measures that include definitions, bench-
marks and transparency requirements for nuclear disarmament.” Kofi
Annan “calls on all the states with nuclear weapons to develop concrete
plans – with specific time tables – for implementing their disarmament
commitments,” and urges “them to make a joint declaration of intent to
achieve the progressive elimination of all nuclear weapons, under strict
and effective international control.”
In fact, the same messages are to be directed to the nuclear
dependent non-nuclear countries. The political obligation under the NPT
is imposed not only to nuclear weapon states but also to their non-nuclear
allies. When nuclear weapon states undertake to accomplish the total
elimination of their nuclear arsenal, nuclear dependent non-nuclear states
have to commence planning for security without dependence on nuclear
weapons, and to develop concrete plans – with specific time tables – for
implementing their goal of security independent of nuclear weapons.
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The excellent approach for this purpose will to commence negotiation
to establish a relevant NWFZ.
Here we need an additional deliberation. To be a party to a NWFZ
treaty does not mean not to rely upon nuclear weapons in its security
policy, though it is an important step toward the end of non-reliance.
For instance, Japanese conservatives will request the continuation of
the current U.S. posture to deter non-nuclear attack against Japan
(massive conventional, chemical and biological) by means of the U.S.
nuclear weapons. This kind of deterrence posture will not be forced to
change by the establishment of any of the NWFZs unless new kind of
provisions is introduced to the treaty.
However, such posture will constitute a violation of the political
commitment of the “diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security
policies,” which was also agreed to by consensus at the 2000 NPT
Review Conference. Under an effective NWFZ treaty with a negative
security assurance provision, any nuclear attack by any of five nuclear
weapon states against states within the zone is illegal under international
law. Therefore, only non-nuclear attacks are assumed to be deterred in
extended deterrence posture (or nuclear umbrella). This will mark a
new stage of nuclear weapon usage at which nuclear weapons serve as
a tool purely against non-nuclear weapons. Not only such disproportional
use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is illegal under international
law, but also it will make total elimination of nuclear weapons remote
until general and complete disarmament is achieved.
In this context, I want to call your attention to the case of Australia
that is under South Pacific NWFZ and the U.S. nuclear umbrella at the
same time. Negative security assurance provision of the South Pacific
NWFZ has been ratified by all the nuclear weapon states except for the
U.S. So the purpose and reason of the extended nuclear deterrence
provided by the U.S. is very difficult to understand. It seems to be designed
to work against non-nuclear attack. It is recommended, therefore, that
a second generation NWFZ treaty includes a provision that prevents
such situation from happening. Provisions to stipulate for non-nuclear
state party’s undertaking of non-reliance upon nuclear weapons in its
security policy or their rejection of first-use by nuclear weapon states in
conflicts involving non-nuclear state parties within the zone might work.
Otherwise, a protocol signed by nuclear weapon states concerned could
provide that they do not use nuclear weapons in any armed conflicts
involving non-nuclear state parties to a NWFZ treaty.
